

Model-based Control, Design and Resilience of Complex Systems

Dr. Abhishek Dutta at UConn

Complex Dynamical Systems



Constrained, **D**istributed, **F**ast, **T**ime-varying, **V**ulnerable



Key: **M**odel-based design, control, resilience

Modeling Flight Dynamics

Force and Moment equations



Time-varying (nonlinear), Distributed (longitudinal+lateral)

$$\frac{1}{m} \begin{bmatrix} X \\ Y \\ Z \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \dot{U} + QW - RV \\ \dot{V} + RU - PW \\ \dot{W} + PV - QU \end{bmatrix}, \quad \begin{bmatrix} L \\ M \\ N \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} I_{xx}\dot{P} + I_{xz}\dot{R} + QR(I_{zz} - I_{yy}) + PQI_{xz} \\ I_{yy}\dot{Q} + PR(I_{xx} - I_{zz}) + (R^2 - P^2)I_{xz} \\ I_{zz}\dot{R} + I_{xz}\dot{P} + PQ(I_{yy} - I_{xx}) - QR I_{xz} \end{bmatrix}$$

Linearize at level-flight, Decouple longitudinal mode

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{w} \\ \dot{q} \\ \dot{\theta} \\ \dot{h} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} Z_w/m & U_0 & 0 & 0 \\ \frac{(M_w + M_{\dot{w}}Z_w/m)}{I_{yy}} & \frac{(M_q + M_{\dot{w}}U_0)}{I_{yy}} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -1 & 0 & U_0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} w \\ q \\ \theta \\ h \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} Z_{\delta_e}/m \\ \frac{(M_{\delta_e} + M_{\dot{w}}Z_{\delta_e}/m)}{I_{yy}} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \delta_e + \begin{bmatrix} -Z_w/m \\ -\frac{(M_w + M_{\dot{w}}Z_w/m)}{I_{yy}} \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} w_g$$

$$\dot{\mathcal{X}} = \mathbf{A} \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{B} u + \mathbf{E} w$$


$$h = [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1][w \ q \ \theta \ h]^T \iff y = Cx$$

Fast dynamics (discretize)

$$x_{k+1} = Ax_k + Bu_k + Cw_k, \quad y_k = Cx_k$$

Constraints

$$|q| \leq 0.2 \text{ rad/s}, \quad |\delta_e| \leq 0.3 \text{ rad}, \quad |w_g| \leq 1 \text{ m/s} \iff x_k \in \mathbb{X}, u_k \in \mathbb{U}, w_k \in \mathbb{W}, \forall k$$



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
MPC algorithm

- **At time t** : solve an **optimal control** problem over a future horizon of N steps

penalty on tracking error

penalty on actuation effort


$$\begin{aligned} \min \quad & \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \ell(y_k - r(t+k), u_k) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & x_{k+1} = f(x_k, u_k) \\ & y_k = g(x_k, u_k) \\ & \text{constraints on } u_k, x_k, y_k \\ & x_0 = x(t) \end{aligned}$$



- Apply only the first optimal move $u^*(t)$, throw the rest of the sequence away
- **At time $t+1$** : Get new measurements, repeat the optimization. And so on ...

MPC transforms open-loop optimal control into **feedback** control

Nonlinear Model Predictive Control (hard Constraints)



Taylor series

$$V(U_{base}) = \bar{Y}^T \cdot \bar{Y}$$

Levenberg-Marquardt

$$V(U_{base} + \delta U) \approx (\bar{Y} + G \cdot \delta U)^T \cdot (\bar{Y} + G \cdot \delta U) + \delta U^T \cdot \Lambda \cdot \delta U$$

Steepest descent

$$\delta U = -(G^T \cdot G + \Lambda)^{-1} G^T \bar{Y}$$


Repeat

$$U_{base} = U_{base} + \delta U$$

Guarantees descent: **Fast**

High-level Learning + Low-level MPC

Challenges: (i) Reference trajectories are **T**ime-varying, seldom known.
(ii) **F**ast and **D**istributed (switching) dynamics.






Two-level control: (i) High-level: learns parameterized references for time-varying conditions.
(ii) Low-level: fast tracking MPC over low-fidelity models.

Model-free techniques can also learn control but are inferior.

Method/Property	2I-NMPC	2I-ILC	IO	GA	RL
Modeling requirement	⌒	⌒	⌒	⌒⌒	⌒⌒
Learning rate	⌒⌒	⌒	⌒⌒	⌒⌒	⌒
Stability	⌒	⌒	--	--	--
Learning transient/Safety	⌒	⌒	⌒	⌒⌒	⌒⌒
Multi-objective	⌒	⌒	⌒	⌒⌒	⌒


Two-level control: Automatic Transmission application





Objective:
Fast engagement
with minimum jerk.

2L-MPC:
Learns the profiles
for optimal performance.

Real-time DSpace
implementation.




Distributed NMPC with Minimal Communication



Fast: Guaranteed coordinated descent

Distributed Modeling & Learning Time-varying Dynamics




Model of i^{th} subsystem:

$$y_i(t) = \phi_i^T(t) \cdot \theta_i(t) + \phi_{i-}^T(t) \cdot \theta_{i-}(t) + v_i(t)$$

Learning Algorithm:

1. Initialize $\theta_1(t-1)$ and $\theta_2(t-1)$;
2. RLS-1. Compute $\theta_1(t) = \theta_1(t-1) + K_1 \cdot (y_1(t) - \phi_1^T(t) \cdot \theta_1(t-1) - \phi_2^T(t) \cdot \theta_2(t-1))$ in the least squares sense and communicate to RLS-2.
3. RLS-2. Compute $\theta_2(t) = \theta_2(t-1) + K_2 \cdot (y_2(t) - \phi_2^T(t) \cdot \theta_2(t-1) - \phi_1^T(t) \cdot \theta_1(t))$ in the least squares sense and communicate to RLS-1.
4. Go to step 2 at the next sampling period.

Experimental Results




Hydrostatic Drivetrain


$$S_p \omega_p = S_{m1} \omega_{m1} + S_{m2} \omega_{m2}$$

Learns uncertain model parameters

Real-time implementation



Cyber Physical Systems Security



FAA: Boeing's New 787 May Be Vulnerable to Hacker Attack
 WIRED
 By Kim Zetter | 01.04.08

Vulnerabilities give hackers
 By Sean Gallagher | Published about 21 hours ago


Researchers have demonstrated a vulnerability in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner aircraft that could allow an outsider to remotely shut down internal cell door mechanisms to shutting down internal computer networks that could allow passengers to access the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.

John Strauchs, who presented their research at a conference in Miami, worked in Newman's ba




Aerospace Security Scenario: Source FAA


Model-based Vulnerability Analysis




Static stealth attack:
corrupt measurements according to C




Replay attack:
affect system and reset output



Covert attack:
closed loop replay attack



Dynamic false data injection:
render unstable pole unobservable






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Control System Under Attack



$$x_{k+1} = Ax_k + Bu_k + Ew_k$$

$$z_k = C_z x_k + Fv_k,$$


$$y_k = C_y x_k$$

$$\tilde{z}_k = C_z x_k + Fv_k + Da_k$$

$$x_k \in \mathbb{X}, u_k \in \mathbb{U}, y_k \in \mathbb{Y}, w_k \in \mathbb{W}, v_k \in \mathbb{V}, \forall k$$



Model-based Monitor Design



Stealth attack: Robust Optimization

Guide to attack target

$$\tilde{z}_k^* = \arg \min_{\tilde{z}_k} \max_{w_k} \left\| y_{k+1|k} - T_a \right\|^2 + \left\| \tilde{z}_k - \tilde{z}_{k-1} \right\|_{\Lambda}^2$$





s.t. $w_k \in \mathbb{W}_a$ Under worst possible disturbances

$$\tilde{z}_k \in \bigcap_{x \in \tilde{X}_{k-1}} \tilde{R}(x, \mathbb{W}_a, \mathbb{V})$$

Remain undetected by the monitor

B 747 at 0.8 Mach and 40 Kft Trim

Altitude hold Subject to Wind gust



Demonstration of Aircraft Hijacking from 30m (but Limited) to 60m .

The image shows a MATLAB R2013a Editor window with the following code:

```
1 %% LM convergence -- Abhishek Dutta -- Aug'2014
2
3 %% init
4 clear all; c/c, Ts=0.05; Tref=Ts*1;
5
6 %% Load and View the Virtual World
7
8 % create and open the vrworld object
9 w = vrworld('vrtkoff_hud.wrl', 'new'); open(w);
10
11 % create the vrfigure showing the virtual scene
12 fig = vrfigure(w);
13 % go to a viewpoint suitable for user navigation
14 set(fig, 'Viewpoint', 'Airport');
15
16 % get the manipulated airplane node
17 airpIn = vrnode(w, 'Plane');
18 % read plane initial translation and rotation
19 originalTranslation = airpIn.translation;
20 originalRotation = airpIn.rotation;
21
22 % set the HUD display text
23 offset = vrnode(w, 'HUDOffset');
24 offset.translation = offset.translation + [-0.15 1.9 0];
25 hudtext = vrnode(w, 'HUDText1');
26
27 %% Add an EXTERNPROTO for Trajectory Markers
28 % Load a tetrahedron PROTO from VRML file containing marker shapes.
29
30 % get the path to the wrl file with marker PROTOs
31 pathtoemarkers = which('vr_markers.wrl');
32 % use the tetrahedron shape
33 MarkerName = 'Marker_Tetrahedron';
34 % create an EXTERNPROTO with specified marker
35 try
36     addexternproto(w, pathtoemarkers, MarkerName);
37 catch ME
38     % if required PROTO is already contained don't throw an exception
39     if ~strcmpi(ME.identifier, 'VR:protoexists')
40         throwAsCaller(ME);
41     end
42 end
43
44 %% Take off aircraft
45 Xo_s=zeros(7,1); tspan_s=(0:Ts:8); u_i=0;
46 [t_i,X_i]=ode45(@(t_i,x_i)longdyn(t_i,x_i,u_i),tspan_s,Xo_s);
47
```

The Workspace window shows the following variables:

Name	Value
A	[1;-1]
D	0
H	2.7888
Hi	1
Hp	100
Hu	1
MarkerT...	Marker_Tet
P	<100x1 do
Ti	0
Tref	0.0500
Ts	0.0500
V	<500x6 do
X_b	<100x7 do
X_i	<41x7 dou
X_i0	<101x7 do
X_i1	[61.9108;3

The Command History window shows the following commands:

```
-cd matlab
-cd feasibility/
-cd ..
-cd feasibility/
-ey_init
-cd ..
-cd flight/
-levmarq
- 09/22/2014 08:1
-cd matlab/
-cd flight/
-ey_init
-main_autkf;
-levmarq
```


A red arrow points to line 136 in the code, which is highlighted in red.

Towards resilience - I: Bounded error estimator

$$\hat{x}_k = {}_k\Phi\Phi_z^\dagger \mathbf{z} + ({}_k\Gamma - {}_k\Phi\Phi_z^\dagger\Gamma_z)\mathbf{u}$$

$$\mathbb{E} = ({}_k\Xi - {}_k\Phi\Phi_z^\dagger\Xi_z)(\mathbb{W} \times \dots \times \mathbb{W}) \oplus -{}_k\Phi\Phi_z^\dagger F(\mathbb{V} \times \dots \times \mathbb{V})$$

$$\hat{\mathbb{W}} \triangleq E\mathbb{W} \oplus A\mathbb{E} \oplus (-\mathbb{E})$$




Towards resilience - II: Robust MPC

$$\mathbf{u}^* = \arg \min_{u(\cdot|\cdot)} \sum_{i=0}^{P-1} L(\hat{x}_{i+1|k}, \hat{u}_{i|k})$$

$$\text{s.t. } \hat{x}_{k+1} = A\hat{x}_k + B\hat{u}_k$$




$$\hat{x}_{0|k} = x_k, \quad \hat{x}_{1|k} \in \mathbb{C}_\infty \sim \hat{\mathbb{W}}$$

$$\hat{x}_{l+1|k} \in \hat{\mathbb{X}}, \quad \hat{u}_{l|k} \in \mathbb{U}, \quad l = 0, \dots, P-1$$





Resilience on Pitch Rate

Results





Perspectives (Big picture)

- (i) **Integration:** New techniques of system design and compositions to distributed control implementation that preserves the robustness, performance and security properties.
- (ii) **Adaptation:** Continuous learning and automatic synthesis of distributed models and controllers necessary.



Perspectives (Concrete)



- 1) **Modeling**: System identification of (non) linear and modular distributed systems.
- 2) Model-based **C**onstrained control: MPC, NMPC, DMPC.
- 3) Robustness to **T**ime-variance: Learning reference trajectory, distributed model parameters.
- 4) Certified system design: (i) Guarantees on recursive feasibility, stability and convergence. (ii) Resilient control and estimation over **V**ulnerability models.
- 5) **D**istributed systems: **F**ast MPC, NMPC, DMPC implementations on embedded platforms.